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The Concept of Warranty Duration: A
Tangled Web
Max E. Klinger*
I. Introduction
In recent years warranty liability has become an integral component of the overall allocation of burdens and risks for economic
and personal injuries in a variety of social and business settings. As a
result, warranty concepts are fundamentally important to the contemporary law of products liability and to the sales of goods and
housing, two of their most prominent applications. Moreover, a variety of statutes, including Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,1 and many state consumer protection statutes,2 have codified certain aspects of warranty
law. Notwithstanding this proliferation of warranty applications and
the growing bodies of case and statutory law dealing with warranties
in different contexts, several fundamental aspects of warranty theory
remain poorly developed. This article will focus on one such area, the
concept of warranty duration.
The application and interpretation of warranties, whether governed by statute or common law contract principles, frequently require associating the warranty with specific time periods. For example, to determine when a cause of action for breach of warranty
accrues for statute of limitations purposes, courts must relate the
warranty to a time frame.8 In other cases, the question is whether a
defect appearing after delivery of the warranty actually constitutes a
breach of the warranty. 4 In these and other situations, courts must
examine various durational aspects of warranties. By reviewing some
of these situations, this article will demonstrate that the judicial and
legislative responses to problems concerning the duration of warran* Senior attorney, National Legal Research Group, Inc., Charlottesville, Virginia. B.A.,
Gettysburg, College (1974); J.D. Villanova University School of Law (1978). Member Pennsylvania Bar (1978).
I. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976).
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1791.1 (West 1973).
3. See, e.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 870 (1974).

ties are inadequate in several respects.
This inadequacy stems from the scant conceptual analysis which
courts, legislators, and commentators apply to the role of time in
warranty theory. In the absence of any significant development of
the theoretical aspects of warranty duration, resolution of warranty
duration problems proves difficult. Moreover, the lack of any sound
warranty duration theory has contributed to numerous anomalies in
the case law dealing with the time-related aspects of warranties.
Consequently, significant bodies of case and statutory law are hopelessly unclear or irreconcilable. In an effort to resolve some of these
problems, this article proposes a conceptual framework for analyzing
warranty duration questions more adequately.
II.

Present Confusion Over the Meaning of Warranty Duration

Courts and legislators frequently treat warranty duration as
equivalent to answering the question, "How long does the warranty
last?" 6 Phrasing the question in this way oversimplifies and confuses
the problem by merging several related, but nevertheless distinct,
concepts. For example, the statement that a purchaser has a "oneyear warranty" is, by itself, almost meaningless. Such terms have,
occasionally been construed to mean that the subject item will remain in a specified condition for a period of one year;' that certain
remedies arise when defects appear within one year;7 that defects
appearing after one year are excluded from the warranty; 8 or that
any action for breach of warranty must be brought within one year. 9
This list does not exhaust the approaches that courts and legislatures
follow in describing the duration of warranties. Moreover, some
courts and legislators employ warranty duration concepts in ways
that defy explanation. 10 The variety of possible interpretations indicates that the term "warranty duration" describes not one concept
but rather a class of several time-related aspects of warranties. Accordingly, the concept of warranty duration requires consideration
not only of the warranty itself but also of the remedies available for
its breach and the applicable statute of limitations.
5. See, e.g., Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890,
893 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Wagner Construction Co. v. Noonan, Ind. App.
403
N.E.2d 1144, 1147-48 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich. App. 169,
253 N.W.2d 696 (1977) (per curiam).
8. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 870 (1974).
9. See Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat
Emptor, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 391, 409 (1977).
10. Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (Conn. C.P. 1975).

III.

Warranty Duration and the U.C.C.
Because of the apparent, although perhaps illusory, precision

with which the U.C.C. purports to deal with these problems, the
Code provides a good starting point for an analysis of warranty duration concepts. Problems involving the time-related aspects of warranties arise under several U.C.C. sections, most notably those dealing with the period of limitations on actions, 1 limitations on
remedies,'" and disclaimers of warranties." Application of these provisions to the various durational features of warranties raises
profound questions about the very nature of warranty protection.
A.

The U.C.C. Statute of Limitations

Time periods affect warranty rights and obligations under the
U.C.C. in several significant ways. The restriction on warranty actions imposed by the statute of limitations is the clearest example of

the effect of time on warranty liability. Under section 2-7251', a
buyer has four years from the date of a breach of warranty to bring
an action, although this period may be shortened to not less than one
year by agreement of the parties.

5

The difficulty in applying section

2-725 lies in determining when a warranty is breached. To facilitate
this task, the statute stipulates that a warranty is breached when
tender of delivery is made, regardless of the buyer's knowledge of
the breach, unless the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance . . .and discovery of the breach must await the time of
such performance .... "16
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977).
Id. at § 2-719.
Id. at § 2-316,
Section 2-725 of the U.C.C. provides:
(I) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year
but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1)
is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same
breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time
limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the
termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure
or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations
nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes
effective.
15. Id. at § 2-725(1).
16. Id. at § 2-725(2). See Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F.

II.
12.
13.
14.

In applying this provision, courts generally have held that the
implied warranties of merchantability17 and fitness for a particular
purpose"8 cannot explicitly relate to future performance. 19 The distinction suggested by section 2-725(2) parallels a distinction in preCode warranty law between present and prospective warranties.2 0
Under that view, a "present warranty related only to the condition of
goods at the time of sale," while a "prospective warranty related to
the future state of the goods."'" Thus, a warranty that a burial vault
would give "satisfactory service at all times" related explicitly to future performance.22 A sale of a computer subject to the plaintiff's
post-delivery approval of the programming created a warranty relating to future performance.2 3 Not surprisingly, a statement that a fire
Supp. 614, 618 (D. Del. 1976).
17. U.C.C. § 2-314.
18. Id. at § 2-315.
19. See, e.g., Wright v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 358 So. 2d 444, 445 (Ala. 1978); General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 352, 516 S.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1974); Owens v.
Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998-99, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, per curiam, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975); Thalrose v.
General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Schmitt &
Hanko, For Whom The Bell Tolls-An Interpretation of the U.C.C.'s Exception as to Accrual of a Cause of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 ARK. L. REV. 311, 317,
326 (1974); Note, Merchantability and the Statute of LImitations, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW.
321, 321 (1974).
While recognizing the general rule, one court rather confusingly stated:
Merely because it is reasonable to expect that a warranty of merchantability
extends for the life of a product, does not mean that "such a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance.".... In order for the warranties to extend to
future performance, the warranty must be explicit.
Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill.
App. 3d 867, 871, 315 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1974) (emphasis in original). The court apparently believed that, while the warranty of merchantability
relates to future performance, it fails to qualify for the exception under § 2-725 simply because it is not an expressed warranty.
At least one court, however, has declined to follow the majority rule. In Kondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890, 893 (N.D. II1. 1971), the court, after
quoting § 2-725(a) and recognizing the exception for warranties of future performance, said:
This exception also seems applicable to plaintiff's Count Ill. Plaintiff alleges
that defendant breached both express and implied warranties. These warranties
relate to the merchantability of the aircraft. It seems reasonable to expect a
warranty of this nature to continue beyond the tender of delivery and extend for
the life of the product. For this reason, the alleged warranties extended to future
performance within the meaning of Section 2-725(2). The four year period began to run from the date of discovery of the alleged breach ....
See also Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 187, 332 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1983)
(expectation of parties, not expressed in contract, that siding "would last the lifetime of the
house" held to create warranty of future performance). Cf. Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
21 11. App. 3d 867, 871, 315 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1974) (suggesting that implied warranty of
merchantability extends for the life of a product, but nevertheless adopting majority rule).
20. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 19, at 313-14.
21. Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 573-74, 344 N.Y.S.2d
101, 103 (1973).
23. Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 983-84, 433
N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1980) (per curiam).

truck was "guaranteed for one year" was held not to be "a mere
representation of the product's condition at the time of delivery" but
rather a statement about the product's "performance at a future
24
time."
Section 2-725(2) presumes that all warranties, expressed or implied, relate only to the condition of the goods at the time of sale. As
a result, the period of limitations begins to run at that time, unless
the warranty explicitly refers to the performance of the goods at
some later time. One common warranty provision - a promise to
repair or replace defective goods within a stated time period - does
not neatly fit into this distinction. Most courts correctly recognize
that a promise to repair or replace defective goods or components in
the future is not a statement that the goods will perform in any spec-

ified fashion in the future. These courts reason that a promise to
repair does not make a warranty extend to future performance.' 5 In
Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co.,26 the defendant,

G-E, sold an electric transformer to a buyer. The sales contract provided that G-E would correct any defect upon proper notification
within one year from the date of shipment. 7 The buyer discovered
soon after installation that the transformer was damaged but failed
to bring suit until more than four years from the date of delivery and
installation. To avoid summary judgment based on the four-year
statute of limitations, the buyer's subrogee, the plaintiff in the action, argued that G-E's promise to correct defects within one year

from the date of shipment constituted a warranty explicitly extending to future performance for purposes of § 2-725(2). The court
disagreed, finding that this provision was not "a warranty for future
performance, but rather, a specification of the remedy to which
24. Commissioners of Fire District No. 9 v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,
573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (App. Div. 1980); see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 453 F. Supp. 527, 536-37 (W.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Annot., 93
A.L.R.3d 690 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648-52, 545 P.2d 371, 37578 (1976); Commissioners of Fire District No. 9 v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,
573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (App. Div. 1980); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d
671, 671, 418 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 (1978) (per curiam); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77
Misc. 2d 992, 998-99, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50
A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975); see also Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1,
12, 342 A.2d 181, 187 (1975).
26. 74 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696 (1977) (per curiam).
27. The pertinent text of the warranty, as quoted by the court, was as follows:
If it appears within one year from the date of shipment by the Company that the
equipment delivered hereunder does not meet the warranties specified above and
the Purchaser notifies the Company promptly, the Company shall thereupon correct any defect, including non-conformance with the specifications, at its option,
either by repairing any defective part or parts or by making available at the
Company's plant, a repaired or replacement part.
Id. at 171 n.I, 253 N.W.2d at 697 n.I.

buyer is entitled should breach be discovered within the first year." 2 8
The court reasoned that the clause was at best ambiguous and thus
did not satisfy the requirement that the warranty explicitly relate to
future performance.2 9
The plaintiff also contended that the promise to correct any defect was a separate contractual obligation that was breached apart
from the breach of warranty and was governed by a separate four
year period of limitations. Without citing any authority, the court
dismissed this argument as manifestly fallacious."0
At least one court disagrees with this view. In Space Leasing
Associates v. Atlantic Building Systems, Inc.,31 the Georgia Court
of Appeals, in a case apparently governed by pre-Code law, mentioned section 2-725 and stated that "[wihile a breach of warranty
generally occurs upon delivery of the goods regardless of the time of
discovery of the breach under Code Ann. § 109A-2-725, where there
is an agreement to repair or replace, the warranty is not breached
until there is a refusal or failure to repair. '"32
If the courts are correct in treating a promise to repair or replace defective parts not as a warranty about the performance of the
goods but rather as a remedy available for a breach of warranty, 8
then the view of the court in Centennial Insurance is, at least partially, correct. Section 2-725(2) is inapplicable to promises to repair
because such promises are not warranties, and subsection 2 relates
only to actions for breach of warranty. If there is any action for
breach of a promise to repair, it must then be governed by section 2725(1), and the question then becomes when does such a breach occur. The Space Leasing Associates court apparently holds that the
breach occurs upon failure to repair or lack of success in repairing.
The approach of the Centennial Insurance court, however, goes
further than merely precluding the application of § 2-725(2) to
28. Id. at 171, 253 N.W.2d at 697. But see Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
29. 74 Mich. App. at 171, 253 N.W.2d at 697.
30. The court stated:
Plaintiff's alternative argument that the one year repair or replacement provision constitutes a separate contract, that was breached separately from the contract of sale, is without
merit. Plaintiff's argument is in essence that by failing to remedy its first breach, the defendant committed a second breach, giving rise to a brand new cause of action and starting anew
the limitations period. The fallacy of this approach is apparent. If we adopted plaintiff's position, limitations periods could be extended for virtually infinite time. We doubt that the Legislature intended such a result.
Id. at 172, 253 N.W.2d at 697.
31. 144 Ga. App. 320, 241 S.E.2d 438 (1977).
32. Id. at 325, 241 S.E.2d at 441.

33. The distinction between warranties and remedies is crucial not only to the proper
application of U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 and 2-725 but also to a sound resolution of many of the
problems of warranty duration. For a more extensive analysis of the distinction and its implications, see the text accompanying notes 52-59 infra.

promises to repair; it also holds that there is no independent cause of
action, governed by either subsection 1 or 2, for breach of a promise
to repair. Precisely why this result should obtain is not clear, al-

though the court in Centennial Insurance thought the reason for this
was apparent.8

4

Whatever the reason, in cases in which the promise

to repair extends beyond the applicable period of limitations measured from the date of the sale, the Centennial Insurance court's ap-

proach would result in a finding that no cause of action exists for the
breach of that promise, no matter how explicitly it specifies the pe-

riod of time.
The trial court reached this result in R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,"3 in which the plaintiffs, the owner and the
general contractor of a construction project, brought a breach of
warranty action against suppliers of materials that proved defective.
The contract specifications required that certain glass panels would
be replaced if they proved defective within ten years. Additionally, a

technical bulletin published by a division of the manufacturer promised that the manufacturer would replace glass panels that showed
certain defects within twenty years." Because the complaint was
filed between five and seven years after the glass panels were delivered, the trial court held that the four-year statute of limitations

under § 2-725 barred any action based on these express warranties.
In reaching this result, the trial court stated that the "[p]laintiffs
have not alleged the existence of any warranties of future performance" and that a "replacement commitment does not amount to an
''
express warranty of future performance. 13
The appellate court specifically rejected the trial court's analysis
and reversed. Relying on Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-America
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
35. 529 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Mo. 1981), affid in part, rev'd in part, 697 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1983).
36. 529 F. Supp. at 299. The contract warranty provided that:
Vision and spandrel glass shall be guaranteed by the glass manufacturer to the
owner for a period of ten (10) years from date of acceptance of the project to
furnish and replace any unit which develops material obstruction of vision between the interglass surfaces. This guarantee is for material and labor costs for
replacing.
697 F.2d at 821-22 n.2. Similarly, the manufacturer's warranty provision read:
Subject to the conditions below, Shatterproof Glass Corporation warrants its insulating glass units for a period of twenty (20) years from the date of manufacture against defects in material or workmanship that result in moisture accumulation, film formation or dust collection between the interior surfaces, resulting
from failure of the hermetic seal. Purchaser's exclusive remedy and Shatterproof's "total" liability under this warranty shall be limited to the replacement
of any lite failing to meet the terms of this warranty. Such replacement will be
made FOB. Detroit to the shipping point nearest the installation.
Id. at 822 n.3.
37. 529 F. Supp. at 299. Cf. Grand Island School District No. 2 of Hall County v.
Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568, 279 N.W.2d 603, 609 (1979).

Corp.," the court reasoned that the warranty satisfied the requirements for a warranty explicitly relating to future performance:
The basic principle underlying Binkley is that in order to
constitute a warranty of future performance under section
400.2-725(2), the terms of the warranty must unambiguously in-dicate that the manufacturer is warranting the future performance of the goods for a specified period of time. .

.

. The terms

of both the alleged Shatterproof express warranties in the instant case contain explicit and unambiguous reference to specified periods of time during which the warranty is to be in effect.
The count I warranty purportedly extends for a period of ten
years from the date of acceptance; the count III warranty extends for twenty years from the date of manufacture of the
goods. Thus, it would seem clear that both warranties meet the
Binkley requirement of reference to a future time.'
The court also rejected the trial court's distinction between warranties and promises to repair.
IT]he district court, focusing on the language in the alleged
warranties relating to replacement of defective panels, concluded
that these were not warranties of future performance, but only
replacement commitments. We do not believe that the presence
of language limiting the remedy to replacement of defective
materials, by itself, is determinative of the exact nature of the
warranties in question. In reaching its conclusion that the warranties were replacement commitments rather than express warranties of future performance, the district court apparently
failed to distinguish between the existence of an express warranty of future performance and a limitation of remedy in the
event of a breach of a warranty.'0
The court's meaning behind its criticism of the trial court for failing
"to distinguish between the existence of an express warranty of future performance and a limitation of remedy" for breach of the warranty is difficult to discern. Most courts, like the trial court in R. W.
Murray, hold that promises to repair are not warranties of future
performance because they are _merely remedies for breach of warranty." In fact, the trial court's result in R. W. Murray is a direct
consequence of that distinction. On the other hand, the appellate
court's decision, while no doubt intended to do justice by making
promises to repair enforceable, seriously blurs the distinction between warranties of future performance and remedies for breach of
38.
39.
40.
41.

333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
697 F.2d at 823 (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis in original).
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.

warranty.

The R. W. Murray opinions illustrate the paradox of the distinction between warranties and remedies in the application of section 2725(2). While it is reasonable to hold that a promise to repair does

not directly warrant the condition of the goods and thus is not a
warranty of future performance under section 2-725(2), distinguish-

ing between warranties and remedies under circumstances similar to
those in R.W. Murray makes the promise to repair illusory and un-

enforceable. The R. W. Murray appellate court avoided that result by
blurring the distinction between warranties and remedies. Attempts
to apply this distinction consistently create problems which frequently arise in warranty duration cases.
B.

Warranties and Remedies Under the U.C.C.

Sections 2-316 and 2-719 are the other principal sources of warranty duration problems under the U.C.C. Section 2-31642 provides
certain general standards for the interpretation of warranty provi-

sions and sets forth standards governing the disclaimer or limitation
of warranties. Subsection 4 allows for contractual limitation of
"remedies for breach of warranty" in accordance with section 2-719.
44
Section 2-7194" broadly authorizes, subject to certain limitations,
42.

U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
(I) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of
this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such consideration is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the
provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
43. U.C.C. § 2-719 reads as follows:
(I) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of

contractual limitations on the nature and availability of the buyer's
remedies for breach of contract or warranty. Section 2-719(2), however, provides that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose" all of the Code's remedies may be available to the buyer.
The specificity with which sections 2-316 and 2-719 purport to
deal with limitations on warranties and remedies is more illusory
than real.4 5 The principal difficulty in applying these sections to the
duration-related problems under consideration here relates to the
distinction between warranties and remedies. While application of

these sections clearly requires such a distinction, the Code fails to
provide any guidance for drawing the distinction between contrac-

tual modifications of warranties and of remedies. As noted earlier,4' 6
courts have wavered considerably in maintaining a similar distinction in applying section 2-725(2). However, the problems arising
under sections 2-316 and 2-719 are, if anything, more intractable.
Examination of the Code's use of the terms "warranty" and
"remedy" furnishes some guidance in this area. Since limited warranties and remedies occur most frequently in the context of express
warranties, the Code's section on "express warranties" merits substantial consideration. While not actually defining "express warranties," the Code does indicate how they arise. Section 2-313 provides

that:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the
price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts;
and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
44. Id. at § 2-719 (2) & (3).
45. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-1 at 428 (2d ed. 1980).
46. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.

part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
or comstatement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
4
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty.

As the official comments48 to this section suggest, the concept of express warranty can be treated primarily as requiring that the goods
conform to any affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods.
The section, however, fails to clarify the treatment of promises of a
remedial character, such as promises to repair or replace defective
goods.' 9 While such promises do relate to the goods, the goods themselves cannot "conform to the . . . promise" to repair as subsection
1(a) seems to require.

The Code contains neither an express nor an implied definition
of "remedy." While section 2-719(1)(a) does provide several exam-

ples of how the parties to a contract may properly limit their remedies, this section affords little insight into the essential nature of
remedies. Section 2-7 1150 addresses a buyer's remedies, but merely
U.C.C. § 2-313.
Id. comment 3.
The federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides an interesting contrast in its
of "written warranty":
The term "written warranty" means(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection
with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the
nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance
over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of
a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain
between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product. 15 U.S.C. §
2301(6) (1976). This definition explicitly treats promises to take remedial action as within the
concept of a warranty.
50. U.C.C. § 2-711 provides the following remedies for buyers:
(I) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract
(Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in
addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the
goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the
47.
48.
49.
definition

catalogues the Code's remedial sections and thus provides little guidance for distinguishing remedies from warranties."
Notwithstanding the Code's failure to distinguish by definition
between warranties and remedies, significant consequences follow
from treating a particular contract provision as a warranty or a remedy. If a contract clause is a limitation on a warranty, then it must
satisfy the standards of section 2-316, including the requirement of
conspicious disclosure. If, on the other hand, the provision is a limitation on remedy, it may be subject, under section 2-719, to arguments that the limited remedy either fails of its essential purpose or
is unconscionable." A limitation on warranty presumably is not subject to the constraints of section 2-719 and could fail, assuming that
the formal requirements of section 2-316 are met, only under the
doctrine of unconscionability under section 2-302. 5 3 Thus, since the
Code fails to provide a clear indication of the proper treatment of
contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article
(Section 2-713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this
Article (Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as
provided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has
a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made
on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt,
transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in
like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
51. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is more explicit, if less comprehensive, in defining "remedy":
The term "remedy" means whichever of the following actions the warrantor
elects:
(A) repair,(B) replacement, or (C) refund;
except that the warrantor may not elect refund unless (i) the warrantor is unable
to provide replacement and repair is not commercially practicable or cannot be
timely made, or (ii) the consumer is willing to accept such refund.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1976).
52. See 3 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:5
(3d ed. 1983) (recognizing that while the distinction between limitations on remedies and disclaimers of warranties may not be "pragmatically valid," it is nevertheless "manifestly correct" because warranty disclaimers are governed by § 2-316 and remedy limitations by
718 and § 2-719).

53.

§

2-

U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:

(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-

conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
There is considerable dispute over whether § 2-302 is at all applicable to a disclaimer of warranties that meets the requirements of § 2-316. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, §
12-Il at 478-81.

various clauses, especially the so-called "limited warranties" which
contain elements of both warranty disclaimer and remedy limitation,
the courts presented with these issues often reach inconsistent
results.
Even those courts agreeing that a conceptual distinction exists
between warranties and remedies draw the distinction in different
ways. For example, in Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,54
an action involving an automobile manufacturer's limited warranty,
the court distinguished sections 2-316 and 2-719, saying that while
both "are closely related, the former is directed to the creation of a
limited duty under a warranty, .

.

. whereas the latter is directed to

the limitation of the remedy available in the event of a breach of
that duty."55 Other courts have followed some variation of the following formulation:
A disclaimer of warranties limits the seller's liability by reduc-

ing the number of circumstances in which the seller will be in
breach of the contract; it precludes the existence of a cause of
action. A limitation of remedies, on the other hand, restricts the
remedies available to the buyer once a breach is established. 6
One court qualified this statement, holding that "[a] disclaimer or
modification of warranty eliminates the quality commitment. ' 7
Distinguishing a warranty from a remedy on grounds that a
warranty imposes a duty on the seller and a remedy determines what
happens upon breach of that duty creates some difficulties, especially
in cases involving limited warranties, which impose upon the seller a
duty to repair or replace defective goods. As noted above,58 most
courts, in the context of section 2-725(2), would treat the seller's
duty to repair or replace not as a warranty but as a remedy. If those
courts are correct, then the distinction between a warranty and a
remedy based on the duty analysis is useless.
Some courts, however, reject any real distinction between the
two. One of the earliest cases adopting this position is StandardAlliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co.,5 ' in which the plaintiff
54. 48 N.C. App. 308, 269 S.E.2d 184 (1980).
55. Id. at 315, 269 S.E.2d at 188 (emphasis in original).
56. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 414, 265 N.W.2d 513, 517-18
(1978). Accord Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Division, General Motors Corp., 83 N.J. 320,
330, 416 A.2d 394, 399 (1980). This formulation is essentially that offered by J.WHIrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 12-11 at 471-72 (footnote omitted):

A disclaimer clause is a device used to control the seller's liability by reducing
the number of situations in which the seller can be in breach. A remedy limitation or exclusion, on the other hand, restricts the remedies available to one or
both parties once a breach is established.
434 N.E.2d 943, 952 (1982).
Ind. App ....
57. Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 58. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
59. 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).

brought suit on a "warranty" to repair or replace defective parts.
While the parties agreed that this was a "warranty," the court observed in a footnote that such a provision did not really fit the Code's
definition of "warranty" 60 but was probably better termed a "remedy." 6 1 Nevertheless the court noted that several decisions indicated
that:
contractual provisions to repair or replace defective parts for a
period of one year were not warranties extending into the future
for one year, but remedies to be invoked should something go
wrong. We see no conceptual distinction between saying that a
product is warranted for one year against defects, the remedy
limited to repair or replacement and saying that should a breach
be discovered within one year, the seller will repair or replace
defective parts. Both are warranties explicitly extending to future performance. We recognize that there may be differences
between remedies and warranties, see fn. 10, but we do not believe that these distinctions make a difference here.62
Presumably the court meant that the distinction between warranties
and remedies is necessary in applying sections 2-316 and 2-719, but
that the distinction is not controlling under section 2-725(2). This
approach, however, leaves application of the Code in a curious position. According to the Black Clawson court, the term "warranty"
means one thing in section 2-316 and another in section 2-725. The
result of the court's analysis is that, while there is no conceptual
distinction between disclaimers of warranties and limitations on remedies, the proper application of the Code requires drawing such a
distinction."
To the extent that application of the Code effectively requires
distinguishing between warranties and remedies, a time limitation
associated with a warranty may relate either to the warranty itself or
to the remedies available upon breach of the warranty, or it may be
a contractual modification of the statute of limitations. If the time
limitation relates to the warranty, it is subject to section 2-316.
Thus, if the limitation satisfies that section's requirements, which do
not address the reasonableness of the limitation, then the provision
could be attacked, if at all, only on grounds of unconscionability."
60. U.C.C. § 2-313. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. 587 F.2d at 818 n.10.
62. Id. at 821 n.17.
63. See U.C.C. § 2-316(4). Cf. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697
F.2d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that the Code contemplates a distinction between
warranties of future performance and limitations of remedies and holding that a promise to
replace defective parts is a warranty of future performance). But see K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts
Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 246, 541 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1975) (strict liability case noting that
disclaimers of warranty and limitations of remedy "are substantially identical").

64. See supra note 53.

However, if the provision is a limitation of remedy, section 2-719
governs. The limitation is then potentially subject to avoidance wherever the provision causes the limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose. Alternatively, if the provision is a modification of the stat-

ute of limitations, it is subject to section 2-725(1), which without
qualification allows the parties to reduce the period of limitations to
not less than one year. It is unclear whether such a shortened period
of limitations could be challenged on grounds of unconscionability.
Notwithstanding the apparent need to determine the precise charac-

ter of the warranty's specific time provision before application of the
pertinent U.C.C. provisions, a number of courts have held, without
discussion or elaboration, that the buyers' claims were barred because the 5 warranties had expired or because the claims were
6
untimely.
Some decisions hold that certain time-related warranty provisions are periods within which defects must appear. For example,
this is the interpretation usually given to warranties on new automobiles. These warranties commonly provide that the manufacturer
warrants the goods to be free from defects and promises to repair or

replace defective parts for a stated period of time or until some number of miles are driven. 66 However, clauses limiting the warranty to
defects appearing within a certain period of time have elements of

both warranty and remedy limitations.6 7 Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the precise character of such provisions, a number of
courts allow the buyer to avoid discovery periods that are unreasonably short under the circumstances.68 While most of the cases so hold65. See, e.g., Henderson v. General Motors Corp., 152 Ga. App. 63, 63, 262 S.E.2d
238, 239 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Halco Industruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 633,
185 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1971); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Ohio App. 2d 41, 45, 392 N.E.2d
1287, 1292 (1978); see also Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1013
(Utah 1976).
66. See, e.g., Lieb v. Milne, 95 N.M. 716, 720, 625 P.2d 1233, 1237 (1980); Broe v.
Oneona Sales Co., 100 Misc. 2d 1099, 1101, 420 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Ford
Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974);
Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 514, 296 A.2d 269, 271 (1972); see also Dennin v.
General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Chapman v. Neil, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296, 1299 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). But cf. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. North American Steel Corp., 335 So. 2d 18, 21-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (promise to repair defects "provided claim is made within one year" apparently
held subject to U.C.C. § 2-607 and § 1-204, as a contractual specification for time period for
giving notice of breach).
67. See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 402, 244
N.E.2d 685, 689 (1968) (clause limiting time within which notice of defects must be given
could also be treated as a modification of a warranty of merchantability).
68. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22-23 (M.D. Ala.
1975) (maximum period of 120 days to discover defect in soybean innoculant); Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 655 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (clause waiving all claims for
defects unless notice given within fifteen days held unenforceable under U.C.C. § 2-719); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 404-05, 244 N.E.2d 685, 687-88
(1968) (notice required within ten days after receipt of shipment); Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Gal-

ing have involved relatively short periods of time and latent defects,
one court suggests that a one-year, 12,000 miles-limitation period in

an automobile warranty might be avoided if, because of a fundamental defect, the limitation proved unconscionably short."9
Finally, in applying express warranties, most courts hold that,

unless it provides otherwise, the warranty relates to the condition of
goods at the time of the contract or shipment.7 0 As a result, to prove
a breach of warranty, a plaintiff must establish that the goods were

defective at the time of sale.7
IV.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

Congress' enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act 72l in 1975 compounded the difficulty in resolving warranty duration problems under the U.C.C.
Since the Act must be applied in conjunction with U.C.C. warranty
principles, 3 Congress created an apparent paradox with respect to
the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability. Generally, the
Act prohibits a supplier of consumer goods from disclaiming or modifying any implied warranty when the supplier makes any written

warranty.74 The only exception to this prohibition, contained in section 2308(b), provides that the "implied warranties may be limited
in duration to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable dura-

tion." 75 The Act, however, fails to define the term "duration." Under
leries, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 1083, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576, 582-83 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (ten-day period).
It is unclear whether these holdings are premised on U.C.C. § 2-719(2), dealing with the
failure of the essential purpose of a limited remedy, or U.C.C. §§ 2-719(3) and 2-302, dealing
with unconscionability.
69. Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 140, 150-51, 271 N.W.2d 653, 657 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd without
opinion, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super.
392, 398, 204 A.2d 494, 497 (1964); see 3 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313:45 (3d ed. 1983).
71. See Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 398, 204 A.2d 494,
497 (1964); R. ANDERSON, supra at note 61; but see Huebert v. Federal Pacific Electric Co.,
208 Kan. 720, 725, 494 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1972) (products liability action).
72. 15 U.S.C. 99 2301-12 (1976).
73. See id. at § 2301(7).
74. Id. at § 2308(a).
75. Id. at § 2308(b). The entire subsection provides that:
For purposes of this chapter (other than section 2304(a)(2) of this title),
implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in
clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the
warranty.
The California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act also provides for limiting the duration
of the implied warranty of merchantability.
The duration of the implied warranty of merchantability and where present
the implied warranty of fitness shall be co-extensive in duration with an express
warranty which accompanies the consumer goods, provided the duration of the
express warranty is reasonable; but in no event shall such implied warranty have
a duration of less than 60 days nor more than one year following the sale of new

section

2-725(2)

of

the

U.C.C.,

the

implied

warranty

of

merchantability relates only to the condition of the goods at the time
7
of sale and not to future performance of the goodsa.
Since
Magnuson-Moss draws upon both state law and U.C.C. implied warranty principles, 77 section 2308's reference to limitation of the dura-

tion of the U.C.C. implied warranties is difficult to construe.
The legislative history accompanying the Act and the similar
bills introduced concurrently offer no clarification of the Act's intended meaning on this point. The 1973 and 1974 Senate and House
reports make only passing reference to section 2308 and provide no
explanation of the precise aspects of the implied warranties to which

the term "duration" refers. 78 Throughout the reports and the hearings held between 1970 and 1973 on similar bills, are assumptions
that some unspecified aspect of the implied warranty of
merchantability extends beyond the date of the sale and that this
relates to how long the goods themselves should last. 79 On several
consumer goods to a retail buyer. Where no duration for an express warranty is
stated with respect to consumer goods, or parts thereof the duration of the implied warranty shall be the maximum period described above.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1973). A substantially identical provision, with modified
time periods, applies to a sale of used goods. Id. at § 1795.5(c).
76. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (1976) (defining "implied warranty" as that "arising under
State law" as modified by the Act).
78. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1606,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974). The most
explicit explanation of the provisions of § 2308(b) in the Congressional reports appears in S.
Rep. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973), where Senator Magnuson's committee wrote:
Subsection (b) of section 108 has been included in the bill to clarify the
relationship between implied warranties and express warranties. The subsection
states that implied warranties may not be limited as to duration either expressly
or impliedly through a designated warranty in writing or other express warranty.
This provision clarifies the relationship between express and implied warranties
on consumer products, by maintaining the independence of one from the other.
This will mean that the implied warranties, created by operation of law, can only
be limited by operation of law and not "expressly or impliedly" by an express
warranty. As a result, suppliers and consumers are placed on equal footing when
determining how long a particular implied warranty lasts. Through negotiation
between consumer and supplier (and ultimately through determination by courts
if that becomes necessary) the duration of an implied warranty such as the warranty of fitness for ordinary use would be established. Thus, a consumer whose
warranty in writing for one year is unenforceable because the warranted product
malfunctioned one year and six days after the time of purchase might still have
recourse against the supplier for warranty of fitness for ordinary use.
It is not the intent of the Committee to alter in any way the manner in
which implied warranties are created under the Uniform Commercial Code. For
instance, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which might be
created by an installing supplier is not, in many instances, enforceable by the
consumer against the manufacturing supplier. The Committee does not intend to
alter currently existing state law on these subjects.
79. See Warranties and Guarantees: Hearings on H.R. 18056, H.R. 10690, H.R.
12656. H.R. 16872, H.R. 13390, H.R. 18578, H.R. 12293, & S. 3074 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1970). During one hearing the following exchange took place between
Congressman Eckhardt and Wallace Breuner, Director & Chairman, Warranty & Guaranty

occasions during hearings held in 1971, witnesses and Congressmen
questioned the intended effect of section 2308(b), but no one clearly
explained what the provision was intended to do.so Indeed, at one
point Congressman Eckhardt said, "Frankly, I have trouble with the
whole section. I don't know precisely what it attempts to have done,
Comm., Nat'l Home Furnishings Ass'n:
Mr. Eckhardt ....
I understand you support legislation that would prevent an express
negative of the warranty for fitness for use, but you would like to have the one
exception, that you be permitted to put a time limit even on the implied warranty for fitness of use. Do I understand you right on that?
Mr. Breuner. Correctly. That is correct.
Mr. Eckhardt. I wonder if you need even to qualify it to that extent. I
would assume that the warranty of fitness for use would generally only assure
that the product was usable for the purpose intended, and that the question of
duration would pretty well depend on the question of reasonableness ....
Mr. Breuner. Yes.
Mr. Eckhardt. But, then, why permit them to say that the implied warranty
for fitness for use in this respect shall only be in effect for, say, a year? I assume
that under your qualification they could negative the implied warranty of fitness
for use after a year.
Now, it is possible that after a chair has been used a year it has already
served what one should reasonably expect to be its useful period. I rather doubt
that. I think it would rather vary on the basis of the product. But it worries me
to permit negativing of an implied warranty of fitness for use even on such a
time basis. What do you think about that?
Mr. Breuner. Do you feel that there is any limit to that? Is there some limit
in your mind? What would be the limit, to answer your question with a
question?
Mr. Eckhardt. I believe it is a common law question, as the whole question
of implied warranty for fitness of use is a common law question, and at least in
most jurisdictions I suppose it is a common law question that might be governed
by statute.
Mr. Breuner. For instance, how long should an upholstery fabric wear; do
you know?
Mr. Eckhardt. What the jury says it should wear. That is the way we decide most questions of time.
Mr. Breuner. Reasonable.
Mr. Eckhardt. That is right.
Mr. Breuner. Except you never know how things are used.
Mr. Eckhardt. I should have said within reason, you are correct. It would
have to be on some standard and if the jury went too far out of line, for instance,
if they said that some 25-year-old fabric should never have ripped when a child
jumped on it with her high heels, I assume that would go a little beyond the
scope that would be permitted to the jury.
Mr. Breuner. You are hitting some of the questions that I deal with day to
day as the manager of a store. I think there has to be some limit to it.
Mr. Eckhardt. But it would seem to me that it ought to be limited on the
basis of reasonableness rather than on a specific contractual negativing of implied warranty for fitness for use. That is just a thought.
Id.
80. See, e.g., Consumer Warranty Protection; Hearings on H.R. 6313, H.R. 6314,
H.R. 261. H.R. 4809, H.R. 5037, H.R. 10673 (and similar and identical bills) Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
92d Cong., IstSess. 183, 186 (1971) (statement of Thomas Nichol, Jr., General Counsel, Gas
Appliance Manufacturers Assoc. (suggesting that Act thereby confuses the issue of when the
statute of limitations begins to run). See also id. at 265 (statement of Bruce Wilson, Deputy
Ass't Attorney General for Consumer Affairs, Dept. of Justice), 278, 284 (statement of Edward Berlin, General Counsel, The Consumer Federation of America), 442 (statement of L.N.
Hunter, Managing Director, Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Institute).

and I am one of the authors of the bill, frankly."8
The courts have not yet addressed the meaning of this section,82
and commentators who have raised the issue do not agree on its import.83 Several writers assume without question that the Act's refer-

ence to duration of the implied warranties can refer only to the statute of limitations on actions for breach of warranty. 4 Another

writer, however, in a thorough and well reasoned analysis of the Act,
concludes that, while section 2308(b) could be interpreted in three
different ways, the most plausible reading is that the period of dura-

tion of the implied warranties refers to the period within which the
defect must appear. 5 In light of the background of general warranty
law, this latter conclusion seems most likely. Nevertheless, the exact
intent of section 2308(b) remains unclear.
V. Warranty Duration Outside the U.C.C.
Many of the same problems that arise in construing durational
aspects of U.C.C. warranties have also arisen in the context of nonU.C.C. warranties, both express and implied. As in the U.C.C. cases,
some courts in concluding that a particular warranty "expired" have
not made clear which aspects of the duration concept were involved
in reaching the broad conclusion.'
81. Id. at 187.
82. A few courts, in dealing with unrelated matters, essentially paraphrase the statutory provision but provide no analysis of its intent in this regard. Hahn v. Ford Motor Co.,
- Ind. App.....
-,
434 N.E.2d 943, 953 (1982); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180
N.J. Super. 45, 62, 433 A.2d 801, 810 (App. Div. 1981).
83. Several articles discuss the section and the corresponding provisions of the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1791.1(c), 1795.5(c) (West
1973), without indicating clearly the precise effect of a limitation on the duration of implied
warranties. See, e.g., Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in
Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567, 590-91, 611 (1975); Comment, Consumer Product Warranties-The FTC Steps In, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 887, 900 & n.84 (1976)
(section 2308(b) means that implied warranties "will be in effect ... for at least a reasonable
time period"); Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial Code
and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26 UCLA L. REv. 583, 638
(1979); Comment, Toward an End to Consumer Frustration-Making the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Work, 14 SANTA, CLARA L. REv. 575, 595-96 (1974) (suggesting that
duration of implied warranties is extended to include "prospective breach").
84. Saxe & Blejwas, The Federal Warranty Act: Progress and Pitfalls, 22 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976); Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on
Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 391, 409 (1977).
85. Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 73, 100-09
(1978). Brickey's distinction among three possible interpretations of the Act - that it relates
to the statute of limitations, makes prospective breaches subject to the implied warranties, or
relates to the time within which is must appear - is the most thorough treatment of the
statute in light of the applicable U.C.C. and warranty concepts.
86. See, e.g., Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 114, 364 A.2d 1221,
1225 (C.P. 1975) (without analyzing whether one-year warranty provision related to future
performance, set a time within which defects must appear, or imposed a one-year statute of
limitations, court barred claim under warranty.where defects did not appear for two and onehalf years).

Consistently with the U.C.C. decisions, some courts have held
that unless specified otherwise, a warranty applies only to conditions
existing at the time of contracting.8 7 Other courts have suggested
that even some implied warranties may have effect beyond the date

of the contract. 88 In one case an agreement for the sale and installation of elevators was followed by a separate five-year maintenance
contract under which the manufacturer agreed to maintain the
equipment. 8 9 The court read the two contracts together and held,

"The implied warranty may not continue for the entire useful life of
the product .

. .

. We hold this language [of the maintenance con-

tract] continued the implied warranty at least through the duration
of the maintenance contract ... ."90
One well established exception to the principle that implied

warranties relate only to conditions at the time of contracting occurs
in cases construing the implied warranty of habitability in sales of
residential housing. Many courts, without specifying the aspects of
warranty duration to which they were referring, have held that the

implied warranty of habitability endures for a "reasonable time." 91
While it is not clear precisely what such statements are intended to
mean, the most likely interpretation is that the implied warranty of
habitability is a prospective warranty, i.e., that the home is habitable
87. See, e.g., Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803, 808, 253 S.W.2d 810,
812 (1953); see also McCloskey & Co. v. Wright, 363 F. Supp. 223, 226 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(architect's breach of warranty with respect to sufficiency of plans "occurred" for statute of
limitations purposes when defective plans were tendered, regardless of when defect became
apparent); cf. Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 163, 168 N.W.2d 190, 194 (1969) (holding
that plaintiff must prove warranty was breached at time of contract, although plaintiff has
reasonable opportunity thereafter to discover breach and notify seller).
88. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 584-85, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257,
263-64, 360 P.2d 897, 903-04 (1961) (non-U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability held to
include prospective warranty that goods would last for reasonable period of time); see also
Scott v. Guschov, 348 Mass. 75, 78, 202 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1964) (warranty that heating
system would achieve certain results when tested at zero outside temperature within one year
from date of contract; court held warranty "continued at least for one year" but that warranty
was "broken from the time it was given").
89. First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ariz. App. 80, 406 P.2d
430 (1965), modified on rehearingon other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 596, 411 P.2d 34 (1966).
90. Id., 2 Ariz. App. at 88-89, 406 P.2d at 438-39.
91. E.g., Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 304-05 (Ala. 1979); Wagner Construction Co.
, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1147-48 (1980); Elden v. Simmons,
v. Noonan, Ind. App. -, 631 P.2d 739, 741 (Okla. 1981); Jeanguneat v. Jackie James Construction Co., 576 P.2d 761,
764 (Okla. 1978); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 33, 298 A.2d 529, 532
(1973); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975); see Note, Elden v. Simmons:
The Standard of Reasonableness Prevails-Implied Warranties of New Home Construction
Do Not "Necessarily Terminate on Resale in Oklahoma," 17 TULSA L.J. 753, 779-80 (1982).
See generally Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 629, 180 N.W.2d 503, 507,
aff'd per curiam, 384 Mich. 257, 259, 181 N.W.2d 271, 271-72 (1970) (under Michigan statute cause of action for breach of warranty accrues on discovery that defect cannot be repaired); Krol v. York Terrace Building, Inc., 35 Md. App. 321, 328-29, 370 A.2d 589, 594
(Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (construing duration and statute of limitations of Maryland's statutory
warranty of habitability); Note, Liability of the Builder-Vendor Under the Implied Warranty
of Habitability- Where Does It End?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 593, 599-604 (1979) (discusses
primarily statute of limitations cases).

when sold and will remain habitable for a reasonable time. 9 2
In light of the lack of unanimity in determining the present or
prospective character of non-U.C.C. warranties, it is hardly surprising that courts have not agreed on how such warranties should be
treated for statute of limitations purposes. Some courts have taken
an approach similar to that dictated by U.C.C. section 2-725 and
have held that warranties were breached and that the cause of action
for breach accrued at the time of performance of the original contract. 9 At least one court, however, held that a cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty that was treated as prospective in
character did not accrue until the defect was discovered." Another
court held that a warranty given by a seller of real property which
specified that the seller agreed to repair any substantial defects
within one year of the date of closing was breached upon the seller's
refusal to cure the defect.95
Despite diversity in form and factual setting of the warranties
themselves, cases outside the U.C.C. raise many problems similar to
those appearing under the U.C.C. Perhaps to no one's surprise, the
courts, in attempting to resolve warranty problems without the guidance of a systematic warranty statute like the U.C.C., have often
been unclear about the concepts with which they have approached
warranty questions; nevertheless, there is a broad conceptual similarity between the difficulties attending interpretations of both nonU.C.C. and U.C.C. warranties.
For example, a number of courts have been forced to determine
whether a given warranty was a warranty concerning future performance of some item or service or merely a promise to repair certain defects.90 One court held that a "guarantee to keep the roof
92. But see Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 305 (Ala. 1979) (suggesting that reasonable
time period is for discovery of defects).
93. See, e.g., McCloskey & Co. v. Wright, 363 F. Supp. 223, 226 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(architect's breach of warranty with respect to architectural plans occurred for statute of limitations purposes when plans were tendered); Roberts v. Richard & Sons, Inc., 113 N.H. 154,
156-57, 304 A.2d 364, 366 (1973) (cause of action for breach of warranty for defective construction work accrued when work performed, not when defect appeared).
94. Hepp Bros. v. Evans, 420 P.2d 477, 482 (Okla. 1966); see Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack
Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 384-85, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 263-64, 360 P.2d 897, 903-04
(1961); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. I, 11, 149 S.E.2d 570, 577-78 (1966)
(cause of action for breach of warranty accrues upon discovery of breach); cf. Weeks v. Slavik
Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 629, 180 N.W.2d 503, 507, affid per curiam, 384 Mich.
257, 259, 181 N.W.2d 271, 271-72 (1970) (applying Michigan statute and holding cause of
action for breach of warranty accrues upon discovery that defect not remediable).
95. Spinso v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 96 N.M. 5, 9 n.3, 626 P.2d 1307, 1311 n.3 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Shuster v. Sion, 86 R.I. 431, 433, 136 A.2d 611, 612 (1957) (contract
specifying that installer was "responsible for anything that goes wrong a year from the date of
completion" was a warranty that "system would give reasonably satisfactory performance for a
year").

installed by us . . . in perfect condition for . . . ten years, '

97

with

certain specifications on how repairs would be made in the event of
leaks, was not merely a covenant to repair the roof in the event of
leaks but was also a warranty obligating the installer to keep the
roof in perfect condition regardless of the defect. 98 On the other
hand, a provision in a roofing contract calling for a ten-year "maintenance guarantee" and accompanied by a ten-year promise to repair

leaks has been construed to mean that the roof would not leak for
ten years. 99 While cases such as the foregoing implicitly recognize a
distinction between warranties of performance and promises to repair, it is difficult to see how such a distinction could be drawn based
upon the results in those cases.
The concept of a warranty with an express time period within
which defects must appear has also been developed in non-U.C.C.
cases.1 °0 For example, in Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc.,' 01 a warranty
on a bus stipulated that the bus was free from defects in materials
and workmanship and that the seller's obligation was limited to re-

pair of defective parts which were returned before the earlier of
ninety days from the date of delivery or 4,000 miles.10 2 After driving
the bus more than 4,000 miles, the buyer complained that the bus
was defective in design, materials and workmanship. Because the
warranty constituted the seller's sole obligation with respect to the

goods and because the defect was asserted after the time period
specified in the warranty, the court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the seller. 0 3 Although the defect, even if it were a design defect, may have existed from the date of manufacture and delivery, there was no coverage under the warranty. A number of
courts, however, have found that time limitations on asserting claims
for defects, especially if the time limitation is short and the defect is
latent, may not be enforceable.1 04
97. Port of Seattle v. Puget Sound Sheet Metal Works, 124 Wash. 10, 12, 213 P. 467,
467 (1923).
98. Id., at 12, 213 P. at 467-68; cf. Russ v. Lakeview Development, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d
641, 645 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1954) (warranty against all defects for one year not a covenant
to repair for one year).
99. Rowson v. Fuller, 230 S.W.2d 355, 356, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
100. See, e.g., Goldman v. Mahony, 354 Mass. 705, 708-09, 242 N.E.2d 405, 409
(1968) (warranty of sound construction "for a period of one (1) year" applied to all leaks
appearing within one year); Russ v. Lakeview Development, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1954) (warranty that construction be free from defects for one year applied to all defects appearing within stipulated time); see also Yamnitz v. Polytech, Inc., 586
S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
101. 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953).
102. Id. at 687.
103. Id.
104. See., e.g., Community Television Services v. Dresser Industries, 435 F. Supp. 214,
216 (D.S.D. 1977), affid, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979)
(six-month limitation held "manifestly unreasonable" under the circumstances); Torrance v.
Durisol, Inc., 20 Conn. Supp. 62, 66, 122 A.2d 589, 592 (Super. Ct. 1956) (ten-day limit);

VI.

Warranty Duration Theory Under the U.C.C.

The foregoing summary of warranty duration cases highlights
several aspects of the theoretical problem of relating warranties to
various types of time periods. The overall inconsistencies and analytical shortcomings of the foregoing cases indicate the principal tasks
of any acceptable theory of warranty duration. Because the U.C.C.
requires the most intricate application of the analysis of warranty
time periods, its provisions offer a useful starting point.
At the outset, it may be instructive to consider how the various
Code provisions apply to an expressed or implied warranty which
contains no reference to time periods. The implied warranty of
merchantability, as previously noted, 0 5 relates only to the condition
of goods at the time of sale or delivery. A defect will breach that
warranty, regardless of the moment of discovery, only if the defect
existed at the time the goods left the seller's control. 06 The defect
need not have been discoverable when the goods departed from his
control. Upon finding the defect, the buyer must give notice of the
breach to the seller within a reasonable time;10 7 the buyer can then
wait until the expiration of the statute of limitations - four years
from the date of delivery - to bring an action for breach of
warranty. 0 8
In the foregoing situation, there are four distinct time periods
involved. These are as follows: (1) the time with respect to which the
condition of the goods is specified; (2) the time for discovery of the
defect; (3) the time for giving notice of the defect; and (4) the time
for bringing an action for breach of warranty. If the concept of warranty duration has any meaning, it must be as a name for the composite of these four time periods. Subject to certain limitations, the
Code permits the parties to specify or modify each of these time
periods. In some instances, a limitation on one of the periods will
effectively limit another. For example, in the foregoing situation, the
statute of limitations provides the only absolute limitation on the
time for discovery of defects.
As long as a warranty involves only these four basic time periods, the Code's provisions can be quite easily applied. When, however, the parties by agreement either modify any of these time periods or create additional responsibilities that are tied to a specified
time period, application of the Code's provisions becomes signifiKansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 420-22, 73 P.2d
1272, 1275 (1937) (ten days).
105. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
106. R. Anderson, supra note 70 at § 2-313:45; Q. Vandenberg & Sons N.V. v. Siter,
204 Pa. Super. 392, 398, 204 A.2d 494, 497 (1964).
107. U.C.C. § 2-607(3). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 363 (1979).
108. U.C.C. § 2-725(1), (2).

cantly more problematical. The principal difficulty resides not so
much in ascertaining the appropriate time periods but rather in classifying the warranty's provisions for purposes of drawing two crucial
distinctions. As illustrated by the cases discussed above, application
of the Code's remedy provisions requires distinguishing between warranties and remedies and between warranties of future performance
and warranties of present condition. Several types of warranty provisions -

most notably promises to repair -

are virtual hybrids with

respect to these two distinctions. As a result, it is not apparent from
the Code's language how it should apply to such warranties.
This problem can be illustrated by considering one common
type of warranty, the so-called repair and replacement warranty. A
typical warranty of this type expressly guarantees that the goods are
free from defects in materials and workmanship. The contract usually provides that the buyer's exclusive remedy under the warranty
will be repair or replacement of all defects within a stated period of
time, for example, one year.' 09 If all other warranties'" and remedies 1 ' are properly excluded at the outset, this warranty apparently
specifies the condition of goods only at the time of sale.
The determination of how the one-year period relates to each of
the four different time periods involved in the concept of warranty
duration depends upon how the promise to repair for one year is categorized under pertinent U.C.C. sections. On the surface, the promise to repair does not make any affirmation about the performance of
the goods themselves after delivery. Accordingly, the promise appears not to be a warranty explicitly relating to the future performance of goods."' The one-year provision, then, does not affect the
time with respect to which the condition of the goods is warranted.
While this seems the most natural reading of the language of the
warranty, the conclusion that the promise to repair is not a warranty
of future performance creates difficulties in applying the statute of
limitations under U.C.C. section 2-725.
If the promise to repair is not treated as a warranty of future
performance, some courts would hold that the one-year promise has
no effect on the accrual of the cause of action under section 2-725."'
As long as the repair promise extends for a period of time less than
four years, the purchaser may bring an action whenever the promise
109. This, in essence, is the type of warranty that accompanies the sale of new automobiles, among other products. See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353
n.3, 355 n.9 (Minn. 1977); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 576, § 2 (1980).
110. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
I1. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
112. See Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253
N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977).
113. See, e.g., id.

is breached as long as the action is brought within four years from
the date of sale. Where, however, the promise extends for more than
four years, as in R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 14
construing the promise to repair not as a warranty of future performance but only as a remedy can result in an unenforceable promise after four years. 115 To avoid this result, it is possible either to call
the promise to repair a warranty relating to the performance of the
goods, as the court of appeals did in Murray,"' or to hold that the
promise is an independent covenant or obligation that is not
breached until the seller fails to repair, whenever that may occur. As
one might anticipate, the courts are divided on the latter alternative '1 7 and do not offer much justification for their conclusions.
To solve the problem by calling the promise to repair a warranty of future performance is unsatisfactory. Under the Code, a
promise to repair does not fit the definition of warranty in section 2313.118 Nor is it satisfactory to say that a promise to repair during a
stated time is merely a remedy so that there is no remedy for the
breach of that promise.'" 9 The third alternative, holding that a separate breach of contract action may be brought upon breach of the
promise to repair, is possible under the terms of U.C.C. section 2725, but there is scant authority to support such a conclusion.,"
Moreover, it is unclear why the seller's failure to perform an
exclusive remedy for breach of contract should constitute a separate
breach. Where the remedy, such as a promise to repair or replace, is
the exclusive remedy, it seems more reasonable to hold that the
seller's failure to provide the exclusive remedy merely precludes the
seller from limiting the buyer to that remedy, which is the effect of
U.C.C. section 2-719(2). So long as the failure to provide the remedy occurs within the statute of limitations period, the buyer may
still pursue the other remedies available under the Code. In addition,
there is no real unfairness in requiring that such an action be
brought within four years from the original breach, usually the time
of sale. Where, however, the exclusive remedy of repair extends for a
period equal to or greater than the statute of limitations, it is conceptually more palatable to hold that the seller is estopped to assert
114. 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983) (ten years).
115. This is the result reached by the trial court in R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 529 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Mo. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 697 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1983).
116. 697 F.2d at 823.
117. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
118. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
119. See Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253
N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977).
120. See Space Leasing Associates v. Atlantic Building Systems, Inc., 144 Ga. App.
320, 325, 241 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1977).

the statute of limitations121 in an action brought to enforce the limited remedy rather than to call the remedy a warranty of future performance under U.C.C. section 2-725(2). This approach avoids the
result of holding the promise to repair unenforceable beyond the
original four-year statute of limitations and does less violence to the
terms of the Code, especially the distinction between warranties and
remedies.
Related to the difficulty of applying the statute of limitations to
promises to repair is the virtual impossibility of applying the warranty/remedy distinction for purposes of U.C.C. sections 2-316 and
2-719. The only certainty on this point is that promises to repair
often operate as both warranty limitations and remedy specifications.
As noted above, some courts and commentators have distinguished
warranty disclaimers from remedy limitations on the basis that a
warranty disclaimer limits the seller's liability by defining circumstances under which the seller will be in breach of contract, whereas
a remedy limitation specifies remedies available in the event of
breach. 2 The suggested distinction is essentially between a clause
that determines whether a particular defect is a breach of warranty
and one that specifies the remedy for breach. 28 Stated more abstractly, a warranty disclaimer is a clause specifying the class of defects which will breach the seller's warranty of the quality of goods.
While at first glance it may seem incontrovertible that a promise to repair all defects appearing within a stated time merely constitutes a specification of a remedy, this view is neither complete nor
accurate. Although such a clause does specify the remedy, when that
remedy is the exclusive remedy, the clause operates much more
broadly. To see how the clause also operates as a disclaimer of warranty, it is necessary to recall that ordinarily any breach of warranty
existing at the time of sale and appearing before the period of limitations has run will support an action for breach of warranty if timely
notice of the breach was given. The effect of an exclusive, one-year
promise to repair is to reduce the class of defects which breach the
warranty. In other words, the clause reduces the class of breaches
121. U.C.C. § 2-725(4) indicates that the Code "does not alter the law on tolling of the
statute of limitations." Hence the concept of estoppel to assert the statute of limitations should
be available. While most courts hold that a seller's post-breach attempts or promises to repair
do not toll the statute, see Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765,
771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afT d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.
1979); Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 1277 (1976), an explicit contractual promise to make a remedy
available beyond expiration of the appropriate limitations period makes a much stronger case
for applying estoppel. See Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. v. USM Corp., 163 N.J. Super. 570,
573, 395 A.2d 521, 522 (App. Div. 1978); see also Foodtown v. Sigma Marketing Systems,
Inc., 518 F. Supp. 485 (D.N.J. 1980) (fraudulent concealment of cause of action under
U.C.C.).
122. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
123. See Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., - Ind. App. -, 434 N.E.2d 943, 952 (1982).

from all defects existing at the time of sale and appearing within
four years to only those defects existing at the time of sale and appearing within one year. 2 4 Because the promise to repair defines the
class of defects which breach the warranty and simultaneously specifies the remedy for breach of warranty, such a provision should be
treated as both a disclaimer of warranties and a limitation of
12
remedies. 5
If the one-year provision of the warranty is initially treated as a
warranty disclaimer, questions about its effect arise under section 2316. Depending upon the precise wording and location of the contract provision, there is a possible conflict or inconsistency between a
statement that goods are warranted to be free from defects and a
separate clause effectively limiting that warranty to defects which
appear within a stated time period. One court relied on section 2316(1)126 and held that such an inconsistency, where the warranty
and time limitation appeared in separate sections of the contract,
required that the words creating the warranty prevail over provisions
purporting to limit it.' 2 7 This is a rational result whenever the warranty and time limitation appear separately or independently in the
contract, although such a result can apparently be avoided if the
warranty specifies that the goods are "free from all defects that
might appear within the stated time." It would be difficult to argue
that in such a clause, the warranty and time limitation cannot be
construed consistently and that if they are consistent, both provisions
28
must be given effect.'
Most courts agree that warranty disclaimers should be construed strictly against the seller.' 2 ' Because of this rule of construction, it is reasonable to require that a one-year promise to repair or a
similar clause, in order effectively to disclaim the warranty as to all
defects appearing thereafter until the statute of limitations runs,
must set forth that limitation conspiciously 30 and explicitly as part
124. See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 244
N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (1968).
125. I R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316:12, 2-

316:13 (2d ed. 1970). But cf. 3 R. ANDERSON,
CODE

ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

§ 2-313:47 (3d ed. 1983) (stating that one-year warranty "is not unconscionable and is

not affected by UCC § 2-719"). See also G. WALLACH, LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1 11.11 (1981) (indicating that when clauses have effect of both disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedy, clauses are subject to both § 2-316 and § 2719).
126. See note 43 supra.
127. Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 244 N.E.2d
685, 689 (1968) (express warranty of merchantability and separate clause limiting claims to
those discovered within ten days).
128. U.C.C. § 2-316(l).
129. 3 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:14 (3d
ed. 1983).

130.

U.C.C. § 2-316(2).

of the warranty clause itself. In other words, a provision that is separate from the language creating the warranty but that is intended to
limit the warranty by limiting the remedy to repair or replacement
within one year should not be effective to limit the warranty to defects appearing within one year, regardless of whether the provision
may be effective as a limited remedy under section 2-719. Such a
result merely puts the burden on the seller to make clear the effect
of the warranty in an effort to avoid misunderstanding. 3' After all,
how many purchasers understand that the so-called one-year repair
or replacement warranty actually gives them less protection than a
warranty which merely limits the remedy to repair or replacement of
defects? The seller, therefore, should bear the responsibility of explicitly pointing out that the remedy clause actually limits the warranty as well as the remedy.
If a limited repair or replacement provision satisfies the requirements of section 2-316 as a disclaimer of warranty, the clause should
also be subject to scrutiny under section 2-719.32 The principal limitation on the ability of the parties to designate a particular remedy
as the exclusive remedy in the event of breach is contained in the
requirement in section 2-719(2) that the limited remedy not "fail of
its essential purpose."' 3 3 If a one-year repair or replacement promise
is treated as an exclusive remedy, that promise can effectively exclude all other remedies only as long as circumstances do not cause
it to fail of its essential purpose. Although courts have given only
meager attention to this aspect of so-called limited warranties, consistency requires that, at least in principle, a purchaser be able to
attack such a remedy provision when the grounds for applying section 2-719(2) are present. Although few, if any, courts have expressly so held, several decisions support such a conclusion by analogous reasoning. In Community Television Services, Inc. v. Dresser
Industries, Inc.,'3 4 a contract for the sale of a television tower contained an express warranty with an exclusive repair and replacement
remedy. The warranty required that any claim under the warranty
131. See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment I (section "seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent
with language of express warranty .... .
132. See note 43 supra.
133. See WALLACH, supra note 125 at 1 11.11 [2][b]; see generally Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th
576, § 5 (1980). It is generally recognized, for example, that where the defect is discovered
within the period required by the repair or replacement promise, the seller must effect the
promised remedy within a reasonable time or with a reasonable number of repair efforts; otherwise, the limited remedy will fail of its essential purpose. See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); Adams v. J.1. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388,
402-03, 261 N.E.2d I, 7-8 (1973); Chapman v. Neil, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296, 1298 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978).
134. 435 F. Supp. 214 (D.S.D. 1977), affid, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 932 (1979).

be submitted "immediately upon its discovery and in any event
within six (6) months after shipment . .. - The trial court held
that in light of the twenty-five year average useful life of such towers, the warranty limitation was manifestly unreasonable and that
the limited remedy failedof its essential purpose. 36 This holding was
37
not reviewed on appeal.1
In Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., " a case involving a standard
automobile warranty, the buyer argued that the twelve-month,
twelve thousand-mile limited warranty was unreasonable when applied to a latent defect. 3 9 In considering this contention, the court
cited U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) and section 1-204 and observed
that there was no authority holding such a limitation to be unreasonable.14 0 After citing a number of cases in which courts refused to
honor short time limitations on giving notice of claims under a warranty, 141 the court stated:
Each of these case is distinguishable from the present case.
In each of them the defect was such that it rendered the product
substantially useless to the purchaser shortly after it was
purchased.
In the case before us the warranty is clear. Ford's warranty
does not cover all manufacturing defects. It only covers those
discoverable within 12 months or 12,000 miles. The buyer is to
bear the risk of repairs beyond that point. Furthermore, and of
particular importance in this case, the car was a long way from
being totally worthless to Taterka. He drove it for 90,000 miles.
The kind of defect necessary to find a time limit manifestly un135. 586 F.2d at 641-42 n.10.
136. 435 F. Supp. at 216; see 586 F.2d at 641-42 (citing U.C.C. § 1-204).
137. 586 F.2d at 642.
138. 86 Wis. 2d 140, 271 N.W.2d 653 (1978).
139. 86 Wis. 2d at 150-51, 271 N.W.2d at 657.
140. Id. Section 2-607(3)(a) requires that a "buyer must within a reasonable time after
he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of the breach.
...
This
requirement is independent of express time limitations on the promise to repair, i.e., the time
within which defects must be discovered. Regardless of when the defect must be discovered,
the reasonable notice requirement of § 2-607(3)(a) still applies. Other courts have similarly
confused the time after discovery when notice of the defect must be given in accordance with §
2-607 and an absolute time limit for discovering defects. See, e.g., United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. North American Steel Corp., 335 So. 2d 18, 21-22 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976)
(warranty with promise to repair defects "provided claim is made within one year from Date
of Shipment"; court held one-year period was contractual specification of § 2-607 notice
period).
141. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975)
(120 days); Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
affid in part. rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (fifteen
days); Torrance v. Durisol, Inc., 20 Conn. Supp. 62, 122 A.2d 589 (Super. Ct. 1956) (ten
days); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968)
(ten days); Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73
P.2d 1272 (1937) (ten days). Of the foregoing cases that were decided under the U.C.C.,
Neville Chemical, Majors, and Wilson Trading Corp., all were based, at least in part, upon §
2-719(2).

reasonable under [U.C.C. § 1-204], or unconscionable under
[U.S.C. § 2-3021, does not exist here. 42
The court left open the possibility of a future holding that the
twelve-month, twelve thousand-mile warranty is unreasonable when
applied to major, latent defects. Curiously, the court never mentioned section 2-719(2), even though the analysis that the court suggested fits well into the framework of that section.
The official comments to section 2-719 indicate that while the
Code generally allows parties to limit or modify their remedies by
14 3
reasonable agreement, there are limitations on that power.
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to
conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept
the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the
contract. Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is
subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made available by this Article are applicable as if the stricken clause had
never existed. Similarly, under subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails
in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article.144
In theory, a promise to repair or replace defects within a stated time
period which also acts as a limitation on the time within which defects must be discovered should be subject to scrutiny under section
2-719(2) to the same extent as any other remedy clause. Where because of the magnitude of the defect and the inability to discover it
within the stipulated time period, the appearance of the defect after
expiration of the limited remedy deprives the buyer of the "substantial value of the bargain," the limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, and the buyer becomes entitled to all remedies to which
he would otherwise be entitled. One method of gauging whether any
particular defect is of sufficient magnitude to cause this result would
be to compare the effect of the defect on use of the product within
the amount of time provided by the warranty for discovery of the
defect and the normally anticipated useful life of the product. 4"
142. 86 Wis. 2d at 150-51, 271 N.W.2d at 657.
143. U.C.C. § 2-719, comment I.
144. Id. See generally WALLACH, supra note 125 at 11.11 [2][6]; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45 at § 12-10.
145. See Community Television Services, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 586 F.2d 637,
641-42 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979) (explaining trial court decision
reported at 435 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D.S.D. 1977).

The preceding discussion has considered the limited repair or
replacement warranty with respect to three of the four possible time
periods embraced by the concept of warranty duration - the time
with respect to which the condition of the goods is specified; the time
for discovery of defects; and the time for bringing an action. The
remaining time period - the time for giving notice of the breach
after the defect is discovered - is not directly affected by a limited
remedy of repair or replacement within a stated time. 146 Unless the
parties agree otherwise, notice of any breach of the warranty must
be given within a reasonable time after the defect is discovered or
should be discovered. 147 At most, a limited repair or replacement
remedy establishes the time within which the breach must be discovered. This alone has no bearing on determining the reasonable time
after such discovery for giving notice of the breach. The statute of
limitations would presumably provide the outer boundary on the
time for giving notice, if a reasonable time after discovery has not
expired before the period of limitations has run.
The foregoing analysis indicates that consistent application of
various U.C.C. warranty and remedy sections to time-related warranty provisions requires identifying four different time periods to
which any warranty or remedy may relate. Only when the time aspects of warranties and remedies are thus specified is it possible to
apply the Code's provisions with consistency to the varied warranties
and remedy limitations which sellers and buyers may devise.
VII. Warranty Duration Theory Outside the U.C.C.
Although the framework suggested above for analyzing warranty duration questions derives much of its specific detail from
U.C.C. warranty and remedy provisions, the basic principles of this
analytical framework can be gainfully applied to warranty questions
arising outside the U.C.C. The reasons for this are not accidental,
for the U.C.C. warranty provisions are at least partially consistent
with certain pre-Code warranty principles. For example, common
law warranty cases had recognized the distinction between present
and prospective warranties, i.e., between warranties that relate to the
present condition of products and those which specify the condition
of products at some future time. 48 Similarly, it has been a long recognized common law rule, corresponding to U.C.C. section 2607(3)(a), that a seller must receive notice of a breach of warranty
146. See note 140 supra.
147. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
148. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).

within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers the breach. 49 Application of the suggested analytical framework would provide a reasonable basis for clarifying several aspects of non-Code warranty
law.
Having defined the concept of warranty duration as suggested
above, one can consider possible interpretations of the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act provisions that refer to limiting the duration of
the implied warranty of merchantability. 150 Considering the Act's
provisions in light of the four time periods contemplated by the concept of warranty duration reinforces the conclusion that the Act
must refer to limiting the time within which breaches of the implied
warranties must appear or be discovered.' 5 ' There is little reason to
construe the statute as relating to any of the other three time periods. Generally, the implied warranties created by the U.C.C. are
warranties of conditions only at the time of sale, 5 1 so it would be
unreasonable to read the Act to require treating implied warranties
as warranties of future performance. Moreover, there is no justification for interpreting the Act as relating either to the statute of limitations or to the buyer's duty to give notice of breaches of the implied warranties as required by U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a). Thus,
unless the Act is read as having no reasonable reference known in
the law, it must refer to the time period for discovering breaches of
implied warranties.
Thus construed, the Act's provision allowing "limited" warranties 5 3 to restrict duration of the implied warranties "to the duration
of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such duration is conscionable and is set forth in clear and unmistakable language and
prominently displayed on the face of the warranty,' 154 means that
the time for discovery of breaches of the implied warranties must be
"reasonable," "conscionable," and clearly displayed. The statute
does not define or illustrate what is a "reasonable" or "conscionable"
time period, but it may be argued that these terms should be construed with reference to U.C.C. section 2-719(2) and its requirement
that limited remedies not fail in their essential purpose' 5 5 and to
U.C.C. section 2-302 dealing with unconscionability.
149. See, e.g., Austin Co. v. Vaughn Building Corp., 643 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. 1982).
150. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
151. See BRICKEY, supra note 85 at 107-08.
52. See notes 8-11 supra.
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2) (1976). Under 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976), a warranty entitled to use the designation "full" warranty may not limit duration of any implied
warranties. Thus, if a supplier gives a "full" warranty, which cannot disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability because of 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976), the purchaser would be
allowed the full statute of limitations period to discover breaches of the implied warranty of
merchantability.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1976).
155. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.

The analysis of warranty duration suggested here could also be

employed in addressing warranty duration questions that arise in
connection with construction and service warranties, an area where,
as already noted, the cases are particularly difficult to reconcile. One

problem in many of these cases is determining the time to which the
warranted conditions of service or performance apply. For example,

the cases holding that the implied warranty of habitability for residential housing lasts for a reasonable time 5 can be interpreted as
maintaining that this warranty is a warranty of future performance.
In other words, the warranty implies that the home is fit for habitation when it is sold and that it will remain in that condition for a
reasonable time. The warranty is breached whenever, between the
time of sale and the expiration of a reasonable time, the home fails

to remain in that condition. Presumably if a development during that
period causes a defect to appear after the expiration of that period,
an action would still be timely if brought within the applicable period of years running from the date on which the reasonable period

expires. This conclusion follows from the concept, applicable under
both the U.C.C. and common law, that a warranty is breached at
157
the time as to which the warranted conditions are stated to exist.

If this is a period of time, rather than merely one precise instant
such as the moment of contract, the warranty is breached at expiration of the period by a defect existing at that time, even if the defect
does not appear until sometime thereafter.'5 8 A similar result would

obtain where a party warrants that a particular job will remain free
from defects for a specified period of time. Of course, such a result
could be altered by an agreement between the parties which requires

that any defects appear, or that notice of any claims be made, within
a stated time.
It has occasionally been suggested that there is some relation-

ship between the anticipated useful life of a service or product and a
conclusion that any warranty accompanying the service or product is
156. See Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 304-05 (Ala. 1979); Wagner Construction Co.
v. Noonan, Ind. App. -..
403 N.E.2d 1144, 1147-48 (1980); Elden v. Simmons,
631 P.2d 739, 741 (Okla. 1981); Jeanguneat v. Jackie James Construction Co., 576 P.2d 761,
764 (Okla. 1978); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., III R.I. 29, 33, 298 A.2d 529, 532
(1973); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975). But cf. Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf, 92 III. 2d 171, 185, 441 N.E.2d 324, 331 (1982) (in extending warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers, court held warranty "limited to latent defects which manifest
themselves within a reasonable time").
157. This is not necessarily true for statute of limitations purposes in a jurisdiction that
applies a discovery rule for dating accrual of the cause of action. See, e.g., Weeks v. Slavik
Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271
(1970).
158. See Q. Vandenberg & Sons N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 398, 204 A.2d 494,
497 (1964).

prospective in character. 6 9 There is, however, no proper conceptual
foundation for such a relationship. In the first instance, a warranty,
whether expressed or implied, that a particular item is free from de-

fects at the time of contract carries no implied promise that the item
will last for its reasonably anticipated useful life. Unless a warranty
is expressly prospective in character, it should be construed as relating only to conditions existing at the time of contract. 60 Of course,
that an item falls far short of lasting for its anticipated life is some
evidence that it was in fact defective at the time of contract.
Similarly, when construing warranties which also include

promises that the warrantor will undertake certain actions in the future such as repair or maintenance, 1 ' care should be taken to distinguish between promises that relate to future conditions or perform-

ance of the items in question and those that in effect promise certain
actions by the warrantor."" The distinction can be important for several reasons. For instance, depending upon the type of promise involved, different events may cause a breach of the agreement. The

time at which the breach occurs will also depend upon construction
of the promise. In theory, a promise that a roof will not leak for five
years is breached whenever the first leak occurs within that period,
regardless of discovery. In contrast, a promise to repair any leaks in

the roof that appear within five years is not breached until the leak
appears and the promisor fails to repair it. In these two situations,
just as the events that cause a breach of contract are different, the
foreseeable damages flowing from the breach may also be different.

In the first instance, the damages should include all loss occasioned
by the first leak, but in the second case, since there was no promise
that the roof would not leak, the damages would be those attributable to the failure to repair. 168
159. See First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ariz. App. 80, 88-89,
406 P.2d 430, 438-39 (1965), modified on rehearing on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 596, 411
P.2d 34 (1966); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 584-85, 12 Cal. Rptr.
257, 263-64, 360 P.2d 897, 903-04 (1961). But see Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co.,
36 III. App. 3d 411, 413, 343 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1976) (court rejected argument that expectation bricks would last many years affected running of U.C.C. statute of limitations); Citizens
Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., II N.Y.2d 409, 416-17, 184 N.E.2d 171, 174-75,
230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198-99 (1962) (alleged oral promise and implied warranty that generator
was capable of lasting thirty years barred by six-year statute of limitations running from date
of sale).
160. See Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803, 808, 253 S.W.2d 810, 812
(1953).
16 1. See, e.g., First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ariz. App. 80, 406
P.2d 430 (1965), modified on rehearing on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 596, 411 P.2d 34
(1966); Shuster v. Sion, 86 R.I. 431, 136 A.2d 611 (1957); Rowson v. Fuller, 230 S.2d 355
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Port of Seattle v. Puget Sound Sheet Metal Works, 124 Wash. 10, 213
P. 467 (1923).
162. See Russ v. Lakeview Development, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1954) (warranty against all defects for one year not a covenant to repair for one year).
163. This conclusion assumes that a promisor's failure to effect promised repairs is an

VIII.

Conclusion

. The purpose of the foregoing discussion has not been to review
exhaustively all time-related warranty provisions or questions but
rather to suggest that all questions of warranty duration must be
approached from the standpoint of specifying which obligations are

related to which time periods. In most warranty transactions there
are at least four conceptually distinct time periods governing various
aspects of the warrantor's obligations and the purchaser's rights.
Most of the uncertainty and confusion in warranty statutes and case
law has stemmed from a failure to ascertain clearly which obligations or rights are associated with each of these time periods. For
this reason, the very term "warranty duration," as a short hand ex-

pression for the notion of how long a warranty lasts, should be abandoned in favor of referring only to each of the specific time periods

involved in warranty transactions.

independent breach of contract that is separately compensable. In the situation hypothesized
here this seems reasonable, since the promise to repair is identical to any other executory
contractual promise. A different situation may be posed where the promise to repair is a contractually specified, exclusive remedy for any breach of a warranty. The case law is unclear,
both under the U.C.C. and the common law, on whether failure to perform a remedy for
breach of warranty supports an independent action for breach of contract. Compare Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 697 (1977) (per
curiam) (failure to effect promised repairs has no effect on running of U.C.C. statute of limitations on warranty actions), with Space Leasing Associates v. Atlantic Building Systems, Inc.,
144 Ga. App. 320, 241 S.E.2d 438 (1977) (U.C.C. warranty with promise to repair breached
upon failure to repair) and Spinso v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 96 N.M. 5, 626 P.2d 1307 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412 (1981) (seller's warranty and one-year promise
to repair defects in real property breached upon seller's refusal to cure defect). For a discussion of the statute of limitations problem under the U.C.C. concerning non-performance of
remedies see text accompanying note 110 supra.

